

Acknowledgements to Volume II

My first inkling that there was something amiss with the Humean conception of the self came before I knew enough Western philosophy to call it that. I am grateful to Allen Ginsberg, Timothy Leary, Edward Sullivan and Swami Vishnudevananda for urging me to read the *Upanishads*, *Bhagavad Gita* and *Yoga Sutras* in 1965. I am grateful most of all to Phillip Zohn for his willingness to argue with me at length about the import of these texts, and for introducing me to Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* in 1969, after reading an art text of mine on space and time ("Hypothesis") that inadvertently echoed its doctrine of transcendental idealism. The influence of all of these works on my thinking has informed my (you will pardon the pun) critical and skeptical approach to the Humean conception from the beginning.

This project has been in production for a very long time. The ancestor of the concept of pseudorationality introduced in Chapter VII of Volume II was my undergraduate Social Sciences Phi Beta Kappa Medal Honors Thesis, "Deception and Self-Deception" (City College of New York, 1974). I am grateful to Martin Tamny, Arthur Collins and David Weissman for their guidance and input at that stage. The ancestor of the analysis of cyclical and genuine preference in Chapter IV of Volume I and Chapter III of Volume II was Chapter II of my Second-Year Paper, "A Theory of Rational Agency" (Harvard University, 1976), for advice and comments on which I am indebted to John Rawls. Both ancestors liased in revised form in my dissertation, "A New Model of Rationality" (Harvard University, 1981) under John Rawls and Roderick Firth, in whose debt I permanently remain. Professor Firth provided the sounding board, the detailed and rigorous criticism, and the personal encouragement that has helped preserve my faith in the value of this project. I am deeply grateful for his involvement with it, and to have known him as a teacher and colleague.

My animated discussions with Professor John Rawls, both about my work and about the role of the utility-maximizing model in his work, were absolutely crucial to my conviction that I was on to something. His example as a scholar and teacher, the breadth and depth of his learning, and his magisterial achievement in *A Theory of Justice* have remained an inspiration to me in all of my work. I rank Rawls' achievement as a *theory-builder* – a philosopher who constructs substantive theories – with those of the middle and late Plato, Aristotle, Hobbes, Kant, and Habermas. A *critic*, by contrast, is a philosopher who mostly criticizes, improves upon, or demolishes theory-builders' theories. The quintessential critic would be the Slice-'em-and-dice-'em Socrates of the early Platonic dialogues. But some might also count St. Thomas Aquinas, Sidgwick, the later Wittgenstein, and Ryle among the philosophical critics, for different reasons. Philosophers may reasonably disagree about how some of these examples are to be classified, and most philosophers evince both theory-building and critical inclinations to varying degrees. But the distinction is nevertheless useful, because training in analytic philosophy is by default training in how to be a critic: We study the views of famous philosophers, learn how to detect areas of inconsistency or fault or lack, and then learn how to correct, supplement or level them.

There is no way to teach theory-building, except by encouraging students to have confidence in their intuitions. So if we happen to incline toward theory-building, we are pretty much on our own, because there are no ground rules about how to proceed. In developing the theory defended in this project, I was fortunate from the very beginning to receive good advice about how to proceed, from another theory-builder who had already been there and done that. The ground rules Rawls taught me were three:

- (1) Anchor your theory in relation to identifiable current problem(s) or controversies. Describe the problems, analyze some recent arguments that purport to solve them, and explain the ways in which these arguments fail. Then briefly sketch how your theory avoids these failures, so that your readers will be able to locate your theory on their own map of philosophical issues in a way that confers meaning and importance on it for them.
- (2) Anchor your theory relative to the views, with which you disagree, of other philosophers who have worked on the problem and have received attention for their efforts. Discuss those views, explain what's wrong with them, and describe how your theory avoids the criticisms you make of their views. Refer to these opposing views in developing your own, in order to bring your theory into connection with a larger, ongoing philosophical discussion among your peers.
- (3) Avoid cooking up a straw man to attack. Show that you take your opponents' views seriously, by making the best and most sympathetic case for them you possibly can, before showing how they disappoint despite your best efforts. The worst that can happen is that really understanding your opponents' views will convince you to modify your own.

In this project I have tried to honor Rawls' ground rules as best I can, in order to honor him as my teacher and their author, and also all of those others from whom I have learned so much by disputing their views in the following pages.

I have also benefited by teaching and discussing extensive portions of both volumes of this project with several generations of graduate students at the University of Michigan, Stanford, Georgetown and USCD – particularly Richard Dees, Jeffrey Kahn, Brian Leiter, Alan Madry, Minerva San Juan McGraw, David Reed-Maxfield, Joel Richeimer, Laura Shanner, Cristel Steinworth, and Sigrun Svavarsdottir; and fifteen years' worth of brilliant and feisty undergraduates at Wellesley College.

Chapter I of both volumes, "General Introduction to the Project: The Enterprise of Socratic Metaethics," was drafted during an unpaid leave of absence from Wellesley College during early 1998 and funded by an NEH College Teachers' Research Fellowship. The NEH support came at a crucial moment and I am deeply grateful for it. This chapter incorporates and modifies some passages and sections of my "Two Conceptions of the Self," published in *Philosophical Studies* 48, 2 (September 1985), 173-197 and reprinted in *The Philosopher's Annual VIII* (1985), 222-246. The discussion of Anglo-American philosophical practice that appears in Sections I.2 and I.3 benefited from comments by Anita Allen, Houston Baker, Paul Boghossian, Ann

Congleton, Joyce Carol Oates, Ruth Anna Putnam and Kenneth Winkler, as well as by members of the audience to the 1994 Greater Philadelphia Philosophy Consortium symposium, "Philosophy as Performance" at which these remarks were originally presented. The chapter received its near-final form during my tenure as a Research Scholar at the Getty Research Institute during the academic years 1998-1999. For providing me with all of the conditions I requested – some very idiosyncratic – as necessary for me to make substantial progress on this and many other parts of this project, my gratitude to the Institute knows no bounds. My debt of thanks to Brian Davis, Larry Hertzberg, Karen Joseph, Michael Roth, and Sabine Schlosser is particularly great. While there I also benefited a great deal from discussion of these and related topics with Reinhart Meyer-Kalkus. I would also like to thank Naomi Zack for her interest and willingness to publish an earlier version of this chapter, despite its length, in her edited collection, *Women of Color and Philosophy* (New York: Blackwell, 2000).

Earlier versions of Chapter II were delivered to the Association for the Philosophy of the Unconscious at the American Philosophical Association Eastern Division Convention in December 1986, Akeel Bilgrami commenting; the University of Minnesota Philosophy Department in November 1987; the Columbia University Philosophy Department in March 1988; and the "Moral Psychology and Moral Identity" Conference at Oberlin College in April 1995, Michael Stocker commenting. The present version has benefited greatly from audience comments and questions received on those occasions, and particularly from those of Akeel Bilgrami, Dick Boyd, Norman Dahl, Jay Garfield, Henry Mandel, Charles Parsons, Thomas Pogge, Michael Stocker and Joan Weiner, with whom I discussed at length an early draft in 1994.

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Work on most of Chapter VI was supported by a Woodrow Wilson International Scholars' Fellowship in 1988-1989. An earlier version of Sections 1 – 6 was published under the title, "Impartiality, Compassion, and Modal Imagination," *Ethics* 101 (July 1991), 726 – 757. Still earlier ones were delivered to the Philosophy Departments of Wellesley College in November 1989, Western Michigan University in January 1990, Purdue University and Illinois State University in March 1990, the *Impartiality* Conference at Hollins College in June 1990, and at the University of Connecticut at Storrs in December 1990. I am grateful for comments received on those occasions, and also to Owen Flanagan, Charles Griswold, Ruth Anna Putnam, and the editors of *Ethics*. An earlier version of Section 7 formed the second half of "Moral Theory and Moral Alienation," *The Journal of Philosophy* LXXXIV, 2 (February 1987), 102-118. On the topics discussed there I learned much from the comments of Akeel Bilgrami, Jeffrey Evans and members of the Philosophy Department audiences at Wayne State University in November 1985, Penn State in January 1986, Georgetown, the University of California at San Diego, North Carolina State, Wesleyan, Memphis State, and the University of Minnesota, all in February 1986.

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“Das Ideal von der Integrität des Akteurs” to the Ruhr-Universität Bochum workshop, Lebenswissen – Medialisierung – Geschlecht in June 2007, as part of my tenure as Marie-Jahoda Guest Professor there. I wish to thank all audiences for their comments. I am particularly grateful to Norman Dahl, and to a young man, unknown to everyone else present and evidently on reconnaissance from another philosophy department, for motivating me to reread Frankfurt and reformulate my criticisms of him. An earlier version of the concluding paragraphs of Section 6 appeared in “Letter to a Young Artist,” *Art on Paper* 9, 6 (July / August 2005), 36-37; reprinted in Peter Nesbett and Sarah Address, Eds. *Letters to a Young Artist* (New York: Darte Publishing, 2006), 83-88.

An earlier version of Chapter X was published under the title, “‘Seeing Things’,” in the *Southern Journal of Philosophy XXIX, Supplementary Volume: Moral Epistemology* (1990), 29-60, following delivery at the Spindell Conference on Moral Epistemology at Memphis State University in October 1990, Betsy Postow commenting. Postow’s comments improved this chapter considerably. I also benefited from discussion with Spindell Conference participants, and particularly David Copp, Michael DePaul and William Tollhurst. Owen Flanagan and Ruth Anna Putnam offered many helpful suggestions.

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the City College of New York, the University of Maryland, and the Boston Area Conference on Character and Morality in April 1988, hosted by Radcliffe and Wellesley Colleges, Nancy Sherman commenting; at the Symposium, *Feminism and Racism*, at the American Philosophical Association Eastern Division Convention, Washington, D. C. in December 1988; at Franklin and Marshall College in November 1989; Williams College, in January 1990; Western Michigan University in January 1990; and at the Conference, *Ethics and Racism*, at Brown University in March 1990. It has benefited from discussion with those audiences, and particularly from the remarks of Nancy Sherman and Kenneth Winkler. Laurence Thomas provided extensive comments on an earlier draft. Tamas Pataki extended himself far beyond the call of duty with not only penetrating comments and criticism but also much-needed editorial help on Sections 1, 2 and 5. I am particularly grateful for his patience and forbearance.

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