Rationality and the Structure of the Self

Contents of Volume II: A Kantian Conception

• Title Page
• Frontispiece
• Dedication
• List of Figures
• Acknowledgements
• Abbreviated Citations to Kant’s Works
• Chapter I. General Introduction to the Project: The Enterprise of Socratic Metaethics
• 1. Transpersonal Rationality and Power
• 2. Transpersonal Rationality as Philosophical Virtue
• 3. Philosophical Rationality: Transpersonal or Egocentric?
• 4. Philosophy, Power, and Historical Circumstance
• 5. Philosophy as Exemplar of Transpersonal Rationality
• 6. The Enterprise of Socratic Metaethics
• 7. Rationality and the Structure of the Self
• 7.1. Two Conceptions of the Self
• 7.2. Volume I: The Humean Conception
• 7.2.1. The Two Models
• 7.2.2. Three Metaethical Problems
• 7.2.3. Hume Himself
• 7.3. Volume II: A Kantian Conception
• 7.3.1. A First Critique Analysis of Transpersonal Rationality
• 7.3.2. A First Critique Analysis of Pseudorationality
• 7.3.3. Some Advantages and Limitations of the Kantian Alternative
• Endnotes to Chapter I
• PART ONE: IDEALS
• Chapter II. Reason in the Structure of the Self
• 1. Is Kant an Inferentialist?
• 1.1. Brandom’s Inferentialism
• 1.2. Brandom’s Kant
• 1.3. My Kant
• 2. Nonsentential Intentional Objects
• 2.1. Intentionality and Sententiality
• 2.2. The Psychological Primacy of Nonsentential Intentional Objects
• 2.3. Intentionality and Subsentential Consistency
• 3. Rational Intelligibility and the Holistic Regress
• 4. Horizontal and Vertical Consistency
• 4.1. Horizontal Consistency
• 4.2. Vertical Consistency
• 4.3. Kant on Horizontal and Vertical Consistency
• 4.4. The Interdependence of Horizontal and Vertical Consistency
• 5. Intentionality, Consistency and Rational Intelligibility
• 6. The Self-Consciousness Property
• 7. Intelligibility and Transpersonal Integrity
• Endnotes to Chapter II
• Chapter III. The Concept of a Genuine Preference
• 1. A Problem about Cyclical Inconsistency
• 2. Savage’s Concept of a Simple Ordering Reconsidered
• 3. Notational Desiderata for Preference Alternatives
• 4. Some Further Limitations of Standard Quantificational Notation
• 5. A Variable Term Calculus: Subsentential Applications
• 6. Indifference, Indecision, and Equivalence
• 6.1. Kaplan on Rational Indecision
• 6.1.1. Preference and Indifference
• 6.1.2. Indecision and Decisional Incapacity
• 6.2. Indifference and Equivalence in the Jeffrey-Bolker Representation Theorem
• 6.2.1. Occasional Truth Tables for Subsentential Constituents
• 6.2.2. Is Indifference an Equivalence Relation?
• 7. Criteria for a Genuine Preference
• 8. The Variable Term Calculus: Subsentential Predication
• 9. De Jongh and Liu’s Constraint-Based Analysis of Strict Preference
• 10. The Intensionality of Genuine Preference
• 11. The Consistency of Savage’s Simple Ordering (T3)
• Endnotes to Chapter III
• Chapter IV. McClennen on Resolute Choice
• 1. McClennen’s Project
• 2. Myopic Choice
• 3. Precommitment and Sophisticated Choice
• 4. Resolute Choice
• 5. Resolute Choice and Genuine Preference
• 6. Two Psychologies of Choice
• 7. Nomologicality and Kant’s Derivation of Promise-Keeping
• 8. Free Riding and Moral Emotion
• Endnotes to Chapter IV
• Chapter V. How Reason Causes Action
• 1. Rational Action
• 2. Literal Self-Preservation
• 2.1. Motivational Efficacy
• 2.2. A Good But Not an End or a Desire
• 2.3. Pain and Physical Self-Preservation
• 3. Baron on Secondary Motives
• 4. Rationality as a Sufficient Condition of Action
• 4.1. How Thoughts Cause Action
• 4.2. Baron on Primary Motives
• 4.3. Minimally Precipitating Thoughts
• 4.4. Will
• 4.2.1. Motivationally Ineffective Intellect
• 4.2.2. Opportunistically Effective Intellect
• 4.2.3. Motivationally Effective Intellect
• 4.5. Fully Effective Intellect and Implicit Self-Recognition
• 5. An Instantiation: Kant’s Moral Theory
• 5.1. Descriptive
• 5.2. Explanatory
• 6. Two Ideals of Rational Motivation
• 6.1. Egocentric Rationality and the Ideal of Spontaneity
• 6.2. Transpersonal Rationality and the Ideal of Interiority
• Endnotes to Chapter V
• Chapter VI. Moral Interiority
• 1. Impartiality
• 2. Modal Imagination
• 3. Self-Absorption and Vicarious Possession
• 4. Compassion
• 4.1. Empathy
• 4.2. Sympathy and Empathy
• 4.3. Symmetry
• 5. Blum’s Argument Against Impartiality
• 6. Strict Impartiality
• 7. Moral Motivation and Moral Alienation Revisited
• 7.1. Motive versus Purpose
• 7.2. Motives and Respect for Principle
• 7.3. Moral Integrity
• 8. Explaining the Whistle-Blower
• Endnotes to Chapter VI
• PART TWO: REALITIES
• Chapter VII. Pseudorationality
• 1. Three Pseudorational Mechanisms
• 2. Conceptual vs. Theoretical Anomaly
• 3. Test Case #1: Encounter on West Broadway
• 4. Denial and Theoretical Investment
• 4.1. The Naïf
• 4.2. The Ideologue
• 4.3. The True Skeptic
• 4.4. The Dogmatist
• 5. Denial as Biased Nonrecognition
• 6. Dissociation as Biased Negation
• 7. Rationalization as Biased Predication
• 8. Pseudorationality in Application
• Endnotes to Chapter VII
• Chapter VIII. First-Person Anomaly
• 1. Self-Deception
• 1.1. Selfless Dogmatism vs. Self-Deception
• 1.2. The Standard Analysis of Self-Deception
• 1.3. Test Case #2: The Margin
• 1.4. Self-Deception and Self-Knowledge
• 2. Affective and Conative Anomaly
• 2.1. Affective Anomaly
• 2.2. Conative Anomaly
• 2.3. Behavioral Anomaly and Moral Paralysis
• 3. Third-Person Moral Anomaly and an Origin of Evil
• 4. Kant (and Others) on First-Person Moral Anomaly
• 4.1. Kant on Rationalization
• 4.2. Kant on Dissociation
• 4.3. Aristotle, Kant and Nietzsche on Denial
• 5. The Self as Unrecognized Particular
• 6. More on Moral Integrity
• 7. Why I Ought Not Spend My Evenings Howling at the Moon
• Endnotes to Chapter VIII
• Chapter IX. “Ought”
• 1. The Authority of Fact
• 2. Commands
• 3. The Authority of Consensus and Reward
• 4. The Loss of Innocence
• 5. Imperatives
• 6. Some Counterexamples Resolved
• 6.1. Incompatibilities
• 6.2. Incorrigibilities
• 6.3. Inconsistencies
• 7. Innocence, Naiveté and Corruption
• 8. Justifying the Whistleblower
• Endnotes to Chapter IX
• Chapter X. The Criterion of Inclusiveness
• 1. Theoretical Inclusiveness
• 1.1. Postow’s Objection
• 1.2. Inclusiveness
• 1.3. Comprehensiveness
• 2. Moral Inclusiveness
• 2.1. Moral Recognition
• 2.2. Explanatory Strength
• 2.3. Inclusiveness vs. Strength
• 2.4. Disconfirmability
• 2.5. Inclusiveness vs. Strict Impartiality
• 2.6. Inclusiveness and Moral Interpretation
• 3. Moral Interpretation and Vertical Consistency
• 4. Test Case #3: The Great War for Control of Reality
• 5. Implications of Inclusiveness
• 5.1. Recognition of Rationality
• 5.2. Recognition of Pain
• 5.3. Recognition of Insight
• 6. Nonrecognition of Bully Systems
• 7. “Seeing Things”
• Endnotes to Chapter X
• Chapter XI. Xenophobia and Moral Anomaly
• 1. The Marxist Analysis of Xenophobia
• 2. A Kantian Analysis of Xenophobia
• 3. Failures of Cognitive Discrimination
• 3.1. The Error of Confusing People with Personhood
• 3.2. The Error of Assuming Privileged Access to the Self
• 3.3. The Error of Failing to Modally Imagine Interiority
• 4. Test Case #4: Political Discrimination
• 4.1. First-Order Political Discrimination
• 4.2. Reciprocal First-Order Political Discrimination
• 4.3. Higher-Order Political Discrimination
• 4.3.1. Transitivity and Comprehensiveness
• 4.3.2. Reciprocality
• 4.3.3. Denial
• 4.3.4. Exacerbation
• 5. Corrigibility and Vertical Consistency
• 6. Kant on the Xenophilia in Vertical Consistency
• 7. Xenophilia and Aesthetic Anomaly
• 8. Xenophobia, Alienation and the Primacy of Principle
• Endnotes to Chapter XI
• Bibliography
• Index coming soon!

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